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INDONESIA'S HAJJ WAITING LIST PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MAQĀṢID AL-SHARĪ'AH

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Abstract

This study examines the problem of Indonesia's hajj waiting list through three focuses: identifying its internal and external causes, analyzing its social, economic, and spiritual impacts within the maqāṣid al-sharī'ah *framework, and evaluating the effectiveness of government diplomacy in seeking additional quotas. It applies a qualitative, descriptive-normative case study approach. Primary data were obtained from interviews with officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bandung, private hajj organizers, and Islamic banking practitioners, as well as official reports, while secondary data were drawn from relevant literature. The findings show that long waiting periods result from external factors, namely limited capacity in Arafah, Mina, and the Grand Mosque, the OIC quota formula (1:1,000), the COVID-19 pandemic, and expansion projects, and from internal factors such as the accumulation of registrants, a first-come, first-served system, and the dynamics of hajj fund management. These conditions cause psychological stress, uncertainty for elderly pilgrims, and suboptimal use of the community's funds. Although quota diplomacy has made progress, it has not significantly reduced the national backlog, so systemic reform and stronger multilevel strategies are required.*
Keywords: *Hajj Waiting List, Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah, Public Interest (Maṣlaḥah), Quota Diplomacy.*

Abstrak

Penelitian ini mengkaji persoalan daftar tunggu haji Indonesia melalui tiga fokus: mengidentifikasi penyebab internal dan eksternalnya, menganalisis dampak sosial, ekonomi, dan spiritualnya dalam kerangka maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, serta mengevaluasi efektivitas diplomasi pemerintah dalam mengupayakan tambahan kuota. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi kasus kualitatif yang bersifat deskriptif-normatif. Data primer diperoleh dari wawancara dengan pejabat Kementerian Agama di Bandung, penyelenggara haji swasta, dan praktisi perbankan syariah, serta dari laporan resmi, sedangkan data sekunder diambil dari literatur yang relevan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa masa tunggu yang panjang disebabkan oleh faktor eksternal, yaitu keterbatasan kapasitas Arafah, Mina, dan Masjidil Haram, formula kuota OKI (1:1.000), pandemi COVID-19, dan proyek perluasan, serta faktor internal seperti akumulasi pendaftar, sistem* first-come, first-served*, dan dinamika pengelolaan dana haji. Kondisi ini menimbulkan tekanan psikologis, ketidakpastian bagi jemaah lanjut usia, dan pemanfaatan dana umat yang belum optimal. Meskipun diplomasi kuota telah menunjukkan kemajuan, upaya tersebut belum mengurangi antrean nasional secara signifikan, sehingga diperlukan reformasi sistemik dan penguatan strategi multilevel.*
Kata Kunci: *Daftar Tunggu Haji, Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah, Kemaslahatan (Maṣlaḥah), Diplomasi Kuota.*

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INTRODUCTION

Hajj is one of the pillars of Islam and is obligatory for every Muslim who possesses the required capability (*istiṭā'ah*) in terms of physical health, mental readiness, and financial means. For Muslims, hajj is not merely an annual ritual but a profound spiritual journey imbued with religious, social, and humanitarian values. In Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, hajj holds a highly distinguished position and is regarded as the pinnacle of spiritual devotion. This enthusiasm leads millions of Indonesian Muslims to register, even though they know they must wait for years, or even decades, before departing for the Holy Land.

Hajj in Indonesia was administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag) until late 2025, when this function was transferred to the newly established Ministry of Hajj and Umrah (Kemenhaj) under Law No. 14 of 2025.[1] The ministry oversees registration, quota management, ritual guidance (*manasik*), services in Saudi Arabia, and the return of pilgrims, with the aim of ensuring orderly, safe, fair, and sharia-compliant services. In practice, however, Indonesia's hajj administration faces complex challenges, the most prominent of which is the increasingly long waiting list.

The long waiting list results primarily from the quota policy set by the Government of Saudi Arabia on the basis of the 1987 agreement of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which allocates one pilgrim per 1,000 Muslims in each country. While intended to maintain safety and efficiency, this policy affects Indonesia considerably; in several regions, waiting periods have exceeded fifty years.[2] The situation was exacerbated by the Grand Mosque expansion project (*Mashrū' al-Tawsi'ah al-Kubrā*) from 2013 to 2022, which substantially reduced quotas at its peak, and whose effects persist because quotas have been normalized only gradually. Interviews with officials of the Bandung Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in October 2025 confirmed that external factors, particularly the limited capacity of Arafah, are key reasons for quota restrictions intended to prevent dangerous overcrowding.[3]

[1] Muhammad Alfia Ilfa, "Reforming Hajj Quota Allocation for Equity: Indonesia's Waiting Period Reduction Policy under Law 14/2025," *Thailand Islamic Journal* 3, no. 1 (2026).

[2] Qomarul Huda and Ilham Dwitama Haeba, "Hajj, Istita'ah, and Waiting List Regulation in Indonesia," *Al-'Adalah* 18, no. 2 (2021), https://doi.org/10.24042/adalah.v18i2.9903.

[3] Tenny Supardi (staff member, Hajj and Umrah Affairs Section, Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Bandung), interview by the authors, October 14, 2025.

Saudi Arabia has proposed vertical construction in the Grand Mosque and Arafah to increase capacity, similar to the multilevel Jamarat structure in Mina, but these proposals are still under scholarly review regarding their sharia validity. The COVID-19 pandemic, which suspended regular hajj operations in 2020–2021, further increased the global backlog, including in Indonesia. Other contributing factors include stricter visa regulations, digitalization through the e-Hajj and Nusuk systems, and infrastructure priorities under Saudi Vision 2030, which indirectly limit quota flexibility for other countries.[4] In contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, some scholars have proposed a virtual hajj using virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) as a response to physical capacity constraints, but the idea remains controversial because hajj is understood as a physical and financial act of worship requiring travel to Makkah.[5]

Data from the Integrated Hajj Computerization System (SISKOHAT) indicate that in 2019 waiting times ranged from 19 to 32 years, increasing to an average of more than 30 years after the pandemic. Empirical studies show a positive correlation between the number of registrants and the length of the wait.[6] The first-come, first-served registration system, which does not prioritize age or health, further prolongs waiting times and poses significant risks for elderly pilgrims. Figure 1 shows that waiting times in several provinces were already long before the pandemic.

[4] Mohamad Hery Saripudin and Mansur Juned, "Boosting Indonesia's Economy through Hajj and Umrah: Opportunities and Diplomatic Avenues," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional* 13, no. 1 (2024), https://doi.org/10.18196/jhi.v13i1.20688.

[5] Shuang Niu, "Virtual Hajj as a Response to Demographic and Geopolitical Pressures," *Contemporary Islam* (2023), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-023-00512-1.

[6] Muh Idham Kurniawan, "Penerapan Analisis Korelasi Spearman's Rank pada Waiting List Jamaah Haji di Indonesia," *Mabrur: Academic Journal of Hajj and Umra* 2, no. 2 (2023), https://doi.org/10.15575/mjhu.v2i2.33174.




Figure 1. Hajj Waiting Times by Province, 2017–2019

Source: Directorate General of Hajj and Umrah Affairs, processed by the authors.

A 2023 case study in Takalar Regency revealed a 35-year waiting period due to limited quotas and high demand; at the same time, long waiting lists have encouraged financial awareness, particularly among Generation Z, who increasingly open Islamic hajj savings accounts as part of their financial planning.[7] Recognizing that the issue cannot be resolved domestically alone, the Indonesian government has pursued bilateral diplomacy with Saudi Arabia to secure additional quotas. In 2024, Indonesia obtained a quota of 241,000 pilgrims (221,000 regular and 20,000 additional through diplomacy), the highest allocation in its history.[8] This increase nevertheless remains insufficient compared with more than 5.2 million registrants, and diplomatic efforts face structural and political challenges, including institutional fragmentation and coordination problems.[9]

Previous studies have addressed this issue from separate angles. Huda and Haeba examine the regulation of the waiting list in relation to *istiṭā'ah*;[10] Farhanah maps the problems of the waiting list in hajj administration;[11] Kurniawan and Dahlan et al. analyze its quantitative

[7] Muh. Nur Fitri Dahlan, Inda Damayanti, and Nurqadriani, "The Factors That Cause the Length of the Hajj Pilgrims' Waiting List in Takalar," in *Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Social and Islamic Studies (ICSIS 2023)*, vol. 3 (Makassar: Alauddin University Press, 2023).

[8] Bisnis.com, "Kuota Haji Indonesia 2024 Kemenag Terbesar Sepanjang Sejarah," *Bisnis.com, March 27, 2024*, accessed November 9, 2026, https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20240327/12/1753208/kuota-haji-indonesia-2024-kemenag-terbesar-sepanjang-sejarah.

[9] Didi Subandi and Yon Machmudi, "The Role of the Governments of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia in Organizing the Hajj Pilgrimage 2015–2021," *Journal of Strategic and Global Studies* 5, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.7454/jsgs.v5i1.1106.

[10] Huda and Haeba, "Hajj, Istita'ah, and Waiting List Regulation."

[11] Nida Farhanah, "Problematika Waiting List dalam Penyelenggaraan Ibadah Haji di Indonesia," *Jurnal Studi Agama dan Masyarakat* 12, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.23971/jsam.v12i1.469.

determinants at the national and regional levels;[12] Sudarto et al. situate hajj management within *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*;[13] and Ilfa evaluates the new waiting-period reduction policy under Law No. 14 of 2025.[14] Most of these studies, however, focus on one or two contributing factors. The novelty of this study lies in its comprehensive approach, which connects the causes, impacts, and diplomatic responses to the waiting list within a single *maqāṣid* framework.

The hajj waiting list problem is thus not merely administrative but is deeply connected to broader dimensions of public welfare, namely religious, social, economic, and moral. The imbalance between high demand and limited quotas may hinder the fulfillment of a religious obligation by capable individuals and create inequities in access. In this context, the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* framework offers a relevant normative approach. Its principles, namely *ḥifẓ al-dīn* (protection of religion), *ḥifẓ al-nafs* (protection of life), *ḥifẓ al-'aql* (protection of intellect), *ḥifẓ al-nasl* (protection of lineage), and *ḥifẓ al-māl* (protection of wealth), provide a foundation for evaluating hajj policies in terms of both individual justice and public benefit.

Accordingly, this study addresses three questions: (1) what are the primary causes of the prolonged hajj waiting list in Indonesia, and how can they be analyzed through *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*; (2) what are the social, economic, and spiritual impacts of long waiting periods on prospective pilgrims and the national hajj system, particularly in relation to *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, and *ḥifẓ al-māl*; and (3) how effective has Indonesia's diplomacy been in securing additional quotas, and how can it better reflect *maqāṣid*-based justice and public welfare. Theoretically, the study contributes to the application of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* in religious public policy and to the literature on hajj management and religious diplomacy. Practically, it offers policy recommendations for the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah. Technical aspects such as logistics and health services are not the primary focus unless they bear directly on the waiting list and diplomacy.

Conceptually, the relationship among the elements of this study is as follows: *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* serves as the fundamental normative value; hajj public policy serves as its administrative implementation; Indonesia's soft-power diplomacy serves as the external instrument for advocating the interests of the *ummah*; and the ultimate objective is justice, public benefit (*maṣlaḥah*), and the welfare of Indonesian pilgrims.

[12] Kurniawan, "Penerapan Analisis Korelasi Spearman's Rank"; Dahlan, Damayanti, and Nurqadriani, "Factors That Cause the Length."

[13] Aye Sudarto, Mesta Wahyu Nita, and Kukuh Cahyono, "Maqashid Syariah dalam Management Penyelenggaraan Ibadah Haji," *Multazam: Jurnal Manajemen Haji dan Umrah* 3, no. 1 (2023), https://doi.org/10.32332/multazam.v3i1.7059.

[14] Ilfa, "Reforming Hajj Quota Allocation."

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative, descriptive-normative approach aimed at comprehensively understanding the social reality and public policy of hajj administration. The approach is appropriate because the hajj issue is not only administrative but also involves religious, moral, and social values. The study describes, explains, and analyzes issues such as hajj fund management, long waiting lists, and quota diplomacy on the basis of official documents, interviews, and Islamic literature, with the aim of formulating practical policy recommendations.

The data sources are of two kinds. Primary sources comprise interviews with officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Hajj and Umrah Affairs), practitioners of special and *furoda* hajj agencies, and Islamic banking practitioners, together with field data from the case study area, Bandung City, where the first author has been registered as a prospective pilgrim since 2023. Secondary sources comprise official documents (laws, government regulations, ministerial decrees, reports of the Hajj Financial Management Agency [BPKH], and SISKOHAT data) and academic literature, including books, journal articles, previous research reports, and relevant *fiqh* texts.

The main research instrument is the researcher, as is customary in qualitative research, supported by semi-structured interview guides, field notes, and interview recordings. Data were collected in three stages: a literature review to build the theoretical framework, in-depth interviews with relevant informants, and documentation of policies and hajj implementation. Data analysis followed the interactive model of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. Data were selected and classified according to the research themes, presented in descriptive narratives and simple tables, and conclusions were developed iteratively by linking field findings with the theoretical framework.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Factors Causing the Long Hajj Waiting List in Indonesia

The long hajj waiting list in Indonesia results from a combination of internal and external factors, causing waiting periods of around 20 years and more than 30 years in some provinces. Figure 2 shows the five provinces with the longest waiting times, together with their quotas and numbers of registrants.[15]

[15] Directorate General of Hajj and Umrah Affairs, *Sistem Komputerisasi Haji Terpadu (SISKOHAT): Data Daftar Tunggu Jemaah Haji 2024* (Jakarta: Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2024).




Figure 2. Provinces with the Longest Hajj Waiting Times, 2024

Source: SISKOHAT, processed by the authors.

Primary data for this discussion were obtained through interviews with Islamic banking practitioners, practitioners of special and *furoda* hajj agencies, and officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. To explore the role of the hajj bridging loan (*Dana Talangan Haji*, DTH), which is suspected of having triggered the surge in registrants, the first interview was conducted with a former DTH provider. A customer service officer of Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI) explained that the bank had stopped offering DTH about ten years earlier, around 2015 or 2016, following a government decision, and that the suspension applied to all Islamic and conventional banks in Indonesia. She noted, however, that DTH is still available through financing companies and rural banks (BPR), which operate much like vehicle-leasing companies, are not BSI partners, and merely leave brochures at the branch. In her experience, DTH borrowers were generally diligent in paying their installments because they were eager to perform hajj, and she did not know whether the suspension was intended to shorten the queue.[16]

To understand public preference for *furoda* hajj (non-quota hajj using a direct invitation visa) as a way of avoiding the queue, an interview was conducted with a *furoda* travel practitioner in Bandung. He stated that in 2025 *furoda* packages cost IDR 300–400 million, depending on hotel and airline facilities, and that packages with facilities comparable to special hajj cost IDR 600–800 million, roughly twice the cost of special hajj since 2010–2011, when queues began to lengthen. He attributed the high price mainly to visa fees set by the Saudi counterpart (*mu'assasah*) and to high demand relative to limited supply. His agency sends up to ten *furoda* pilgrims from Bandung each year, while national agencies may send up to one hundred, a trend that has persisted for more than fifteen years. According to him, the surge of registrations in

[16] Lia Defita Sari (customer service officer, Bank Syariah Indonesia, Bojonegoro Main Branch Office), interview by the authors, August 16, 2025.

2010–2011 was driven by DTH, which allowed people with limited funds to register merely to secure a queue number; the 2015 DTH suspension may have helped slightly, but the queue was already long and was further extended by the cancellation of hajj in 2020 and its limitation in 2021. He identified the limited capacity of Arafah and Makkah as the main factor behind the long queue.[17]

An interview with an official special hajj organizer in Bandung confirmed similar findings: the special hajj queue in West Java averages seven years due to high demand and limited slots, the surge of DTH users in 2010–2011 initiated longer queues, and the COVID-19 pandemic caused further delays.[18] A staff member of the Hajj and Umrah Affairs Section of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bandung stated that the regular hajj queue in Bandung is 20–21 years and the special hajj queue seven years. She attributed the long queues to increased awareness and participation, the limited capacity of Arafah and Mina, the ongoing Grand Mosque expansion, and pandemic-related cancellations, adding that repeat pilgrimages also affect the queue, although regulations now bar re-registration within ten years of a previous hajj.[19]

The interviews indicate that Indonesia's long hajj queues are influenced not only by domestic factors, such as the surge in DTH-based registrations, but also by structural and policy limitations in Saudi Arabia concerning safety, physical capacity, and sharia compliance.

Global Quota Limitations Based on the OIC Agreement

The global hajj quota is determined by the formula of one pilgrim per 1,000 Muslims, adopted by the OIC in 1987. Indonesia, with more than 237 million Muslims, receives approximately 221,000–241,000 pilgrims per year, while active registrants number 5.2 million. From the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, quota limitations serve the general public interest (*maṣlaḥah 'āmmah*) and the prevention of harm (*dar' al-mafāsid*), because unrestricted numbers could lead to overcrowding, health risks, and mass fatalities. Consequently, Indonesia faces an annual backlog that extends waiting times. Table 1 shows the quotas allocated to Indonesia during the Grand Mosque expansion period.

Table 1. Hajj Quotas Allocated by Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, 2012–2017

Year	Base Quota	Additional Quota	Total Quota	Note
2012	211,000	–	211,000	Before the Grand Mosque expansion
2013	211,000	–	168,800	20% cut due to the Grand Mosque expansion

[17] Kukuh Prabowo (furoda hajj travel practitioner and consultant, AMPHURI Bandung), interview by the authors, August 24, 2025.

[18] Ivan (staff member, AMWA Tour Bandung), interview by the authors, August 26, 2025.

[19] Supardi, interview.

Year	Base Quota	Additional Quota	Total Quota	Note
2014	168,800	–	168,800	–
2015	168,800	–	168,800	–
2016	168,800	–	168,800	–
2017	211,000	10,000	221,000	Quota restored after the expansion

Source:

Limited Capacity of the Mashā'ir (Arafah, Muzdalifah, and Mina)

The holy sites cannot be freely expanded because the *sharī'ah* prescribes the standing at Arafah and the rituals at Muzdalifah and Mina within defined boundaries. Renovations and modern technology, such as air-conditioned tents, the five-level Jamarat bridge, and integrated transportation, improve efficiency but do not increase capacity drastically. Global quotas therefore grow only incrementally, by about 10,000–30,000 per year, in line with population growth and with *ḥifẓ al-nafs*.

Rapid Growth of Hajj Registrants

High religiosity, the obligation of the pillars of Islam, socio-cultural factors, and Islamic financial literacy drive hajj enthusiasm in Indonesia. The phenomenon of repeat pilgrims also appears, as some people register multiple times.[20] Economic and demographic factors, including sharia savings, hajj bridging loans, and non-bank financing, accelerate registrant growth.[21] Even after the termination of bank-based DTH, registrant growth has remained higher than the quota increases obtained through regular allocation and diplomatic negotiation, resulting in a considerable backlog.[22]

The First-Come, First-Served Registration System

The first-come, first-served (FCFS) system is administratively fair but raises problems: elderly registrants whose health declines while waiting, children registered with their parents' funds, and potential inequity in access to hajj. From the perspective of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, hajj priority should take into account *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-māl*, *ḥifẓ al-'aql*, *ḥifẓ al-nasl*, and *ḥifẓ al-'irḍ*.

[20] Farhanah, "Problematika Waiting List."

[21] Dewi Rahayu and Ismail Marzuki, "Analisis Pembiayaan Dana Talangan Haji Perspektif Etika Bisnis Islam," *KITABAH: Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Syariah* 4, no. 1 (2020); Ely Umaroh and Fajar Fajar, "Review of the Fatwa of the National Sharia Council (DSN-MUI) on Financing the Hajj Management of Sharia Financial Institutions at BMT NU," *Et-Tijarie: Jurnal Hukum dan Bisnis Syariah* 9, no. 2 (2024).

[22] Muhammad Tho'in and Iin Emy Prastiwi, "Analisis Dana Talangan Haji Berdasarkan Fatwa No. 29/DSN-MUI/VI/2002 (Studi Kasus pada BPRS Dana Mulia Surakarta)," *Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Islam* 2, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.29040/jiei.v2i01.62.

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The 2020–2021 pandemic halted regular hajj departures, eliminating two years of quota, adding approximately 420,000 people to the backlog, and extending waiting times by two to five years. These restrictions fall under sharia emergency (*ḍarūrah shar'iyyah*), consistent with the legal maxim *al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt* (necessities make prohibited things permissible).[23]

Accumulation of Hajj Funds

Pilgrims' funds are held for 10–40 years, and their returns form part of the Ummah Endowment Fund (*Dana Abadi Umat*, DAU), now managed by the BPKH. While this strengthens national Islamic finance, it also carries risks of intergenerational inequity, misallocation, and corruption. Pilgrims' funds are a sharia trust (*amānah*) and must be kept safe, transparent, and low-risk.[24] Unfortunately, the DAU has been the object of corruption by its own officials. Of the four leadership periods of the DAU management body between 2001 and 2018, two ended with convictions for corruption involving hajj funds, as summarized in Table 2.[25]

Table 2**.** Leadership of the Ummah Endowment Fund (BP-DAU) and Related Corruption Cases, 2001–2018

Period	Minister of Religious Affairs (Chair of BP-DAU)	Director General / BP-DAU Executive	Legal Outcome Related to Hajj Funds
2001–2004	Said Agil Husin Al Munawar	Taufik Kamil	Both convicted of corruption involving the DAU
2004–2009	Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni	Slamet Riyanto	No conviction
2009–2014	Suryadharma Ali	Anggito Abimanyu	Minister convicted of corruption in hajj administration, including misuse of the DAU
2014–2018	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	Abdul Djamil	No conviction

[23] Yuyun Yuningsih, Haliza Bagja, and Burhanudin Aulia, "Strategi Pelayanan Calon Jemaah Haji Musim Pandemi," *Mabrur: Academic Journal of Hajj and Umra* 1, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.15575/mjhu.v1i1.17523.

[24] Muhammad Aziz Zakiruddin, "Problematika Regulasi Pengelolaan Dana Abadi Umat: Disharmonisasi Kelembagaan dan Legal Standing," *Media Syari'ah: Wahana Kajian Hukum Islam dan Pranata Sosial* 23, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.22373/jms.v23i1.9494.

[25] Hukumonline, "Mantan Menteri Agama Divonis Lima Tahun Penjara," *Hukumonline*, accessed November 9, 2026, https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/mantan-menteri-agama-divonis-lima-tahun-penjara--hol14344/; Detikcom, "Taufik Kamil Divonis 4 Tahun," *detikNews*, accessed November 9, 2026, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-534448/taufik-kamil-divonis-4-tahun; Bayu Firdaus, "Masalah Regulasi dan Pengawasan dalam Praktik Korupsi Haji Tahun 2010–2013," *Jurnal Politik* 3, no. 1 (2017), https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v3i1.1096.

Source:

Social, Economic, and Spiritual Impacts

Social impacts. Long waiting times shift the age composition of pilgrims (62 percent aged 50–70, 21 percent over 70, and 15 percent younger), lowering the quality of worship and increasing family burdens. Regional disparities, with waiting times of up to 47 years in some regencies of South Sulawesi compared with about 12 years in North Maluku, create inequity, and a "politicization of quota" emerges as hajj becomes a status symbol. Figure 3 illustrates the authors' projection of quota composition by age group under an age-priority ratio scheme, in which elderly registrants are designated the highest priority for departure.




Figure 3. Projected Quota Composition by Age Group under an Age-Priority Ratio Scheme, 2024–2030
Source: Authors' simulation (see Table 3).

Economic impacts. Extended waiting times tie up pilgrims' funds for decades, while the costs of special and *furoda* hajj rise sharply because of high demand.

Spiritual impacts. Long queues cause anxiety, diminished motivation, distorted intentions, and the postponement of obligatory worship, undermining the objectives of the *sharī'ah*, including *ḥifẓ al-dīn* and the purification of wealth (*tazkiyat al-māl*).

Overall, Indonesia's long hajj waiting list results from limited global quotas, the capacity constraints of the *mashā'ir*, rapid registrant growth, the FCFS system, pandemic disruptions, and the accumulation of funds, and it produces significant social, economic, and spiritual impacts.

Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Indonesia's Hajj Quota Diplomacy

Religious Context of Hajj Diplomacy

Hajj diplomacy has strong *shar'ī* legitimacy. From the perspective of *fiqh al-siyāsah* and *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, the organization of hajj falls within the level of necessity (*ḍarūriyyāt*), so the

government is obliged to facilitate the fulfillment of citizens' religious duties.[26] The legal maxim *mā lā yatimm al-wājib illā bihi fa-huwa wājib* (that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself obligatory) applies here: since hajj cannot be performed without a sufficient quota, the government bears a collective obligation (*wājib kifā'ī*) to negotiate quota increases diplomatically and to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia. This is consistent with al-Māwardī's view that the state is responsible for facilitating obligatory worship and removing obstacles beyond the public's capacity, which makes hajj diplomacy essentially oriented toward worship rather than merely political.[27]

High-Level Diplomacy

Diplomacy with the Saudi authorities, especially the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (*Khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn*), requires high-level engagement by the President of Indonesia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Religious Affairs (now the Minister of Hajj and Umrah) with senior Saudi officials. Table 3 presents the authors' proposed quota targets that could be negotiated with the Saudi hajj authority under an age-priority ratio scheme.

Table 3**.** Proposed Quota Targets by Age Group under an Age-Priority Ratio Scheme, 2024–2030

Divisor	Year	>70 years (ratio 1)	60–70 years (ratio 2)	50–60 years (ratio 3)	Target	Rounded Target
10	2024	38,884	77,767	116,651	233,301	234,000
9	2025	43,204	86,408	129,612	259,223	260,000
8	2026	48,604	97,209	145,813	291,626	292,000
7	2027	55,548	111,096	166,644	333,287	334,000
6	2028	64,806	129,612	194,418	388,835	389,000
5	2029	77,767	155,534	233,301	466,602	467,000
4	2030	97,209	194,418	291,626	583,253	584,000

Source:

The achievements of high-level diplomacy include an additional quota of 10,000 pilgrims in 2017–2019, additional quotas of 8,000–20,000 pilgrims after the pandemic (2023–2024), and stronger Indonesia–Saudi bilateral relations. High-level diplomacy accords with the principle that sharia-based policy must be built on public interest (*taṣarruf al-imām 'alā al-ra'iyyah manūṭ bi*

[26] Sudarto, Nita, and Cahyono, "Maqashid Syariah dalam Management."
[27] Subandi and Machmudi, "Role of the Governments of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia."

al-maṣlaḥah) and aims to facilitate worship, enhance safety, and protect *ḥifẓ al-dīn* and *ḥifẓ al-nafs*. However, structural constraints, such as the capacity of the *mashā'ir*, the global OIC formula, and safety standards, limit large increases in quota.[28]

Technical Diplomacy

Technical diplomacy involves the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Directorate General of Hajj and Umrah Affairs, the Indonesian Embassy and Consulate General in Saudi Arabia, and the Indonesian hajj missions and technical offices. Their responsibilities range from conceptual planning and data provision to operational management on the ground. Its outcomes include optimized transportation at the *mashā'ir*, improved catering and services, reduced pilgrim mortality risk, and the implementation of digital hajj systems. Religiously, these technical improvements reflect the principle that preserving life takes precedence, as a practical implementation of *ḥifẓ al-nafs*.

Multilateral Diplomacy

Indonesia also engages in multilateral forums such as the OIC, the Islamic hajj conferences, and forums of Muslim ministers, with the goals of achieving fair quota distribution, enabling dynamic reallocation of underutilized slots, and prioritizing countries with long waiting lists. Religiously, this accords with Q. al-Mā'idah 5:2, "Help one another in goodness and piety," which promotes justice and equitable access to worship. Its limitations include quotas determined unilaterally by Saudi Arabia, resistance from smaller states, and the non-binding nature of OIC decisions.

Overall Evaluation

Diplomacy has been effective in securing incremental quota increases, improving services and facilities, simplifying visa procedures, and strengthening bilateral relations. It has been less effective in significantly reducing the waiting list, reforming the global quota structure, and resolving the backlog of 5.2 million registrants. Diplomacy can therefore secure small quota increases and service improvements, but it cannot transform the global quota system; a systemic approach beyond diplomacy is needed.

A Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah Analysis of Indonesia's Hajj System

This analysis frames the hajj system through the essential objectives of the *sharī'ah* (*al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khams*, or *al-sitt* according to some scholars), namely religion, life, intellect, progeny, wealth, and, in the view of some scholars, honor. Contemporary scholars such as Jasser Auda emphasize a contextual and interconnected understanding of the *maqāṣid*, so that every policy decision, from quotas to fund management, must avoid unintended harm while addressing

[28] Ilfa, "Reforming Hajj Quota Allocation."

practical realities.[29] More recent studies argue that hajj administration and management should uphold these essential objectives in order to secure the public interest.[30] The following analysis outlines the ideal conditions that a hajj administration system should meet to achieve individual justice and public benefit, providing a perspective from which the robustness of the current system can be examined.

Ḥifẓ al-Dīn (Preserving Religion)

Hajj is an obligatory pillar of Islam (Q. Āl 'Imrān 3:97). Waiting lists of 20–47 years prevent its timely fulfillment, particularly for older registrants, which runs counter to *ḥifẓ al-dīn*. The principle of ease (*al-taysīr*) (Q. al-Baqarah 2:185) requires that obligations of worship remain attainable.

Ḥifẓ al-Nafs (Preserving Life)

Most registrants are elderly (60–70 years and older), which increases health risks during hajj. Extended waiting lists force pilgrims to perform the rituals when they are physically vulnerable, contrary to the hadith "There should be neither harm nor reciprocal harm" (*lā ḍarar wa lā ḍirār*), narrated by Ibn Mājah.

Ḥifẓ al-Māl (Preserving Wealth)

Pilgrims' funds retained for 10–40 years risk losing value through inflation and potential mismanagement, undermining the trust (*amānah*) prescribed in Q. al-Nisā' 4:58. Justice in financing worship is therefore essential.[31]

Ḥifẓ al-'Aql (Preserving Intellect and Mental Health)

Long and uncertain waiting periods create anxiety, stress, and demotivation, contrary to the principle that worship should bring tranquility to the heart (Q. al-Ra'd 13:28). Excessive administrative uncertainty (*gharar*) must therefore be minimized.

Ḥifẓ al-Nasl (Preserving Progeny)

Parents often register minors to secure a place in the queue, which creates administrative, ethical, and equity concerns: children are not yet legally obligated (*mukallaf*), adults with an immediate obligation may be disadvantaged, and the balance of justice envisaged by the *maqāṣid* is disrupted.

[29] Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008).

[30] Sudarto, Nita, and Cahyono, "Maqashid Syariah dalam Management."

[31] Firdaus, "Masalah Regulasi dan Pengawasan."

Research Findings

External Roots of the Waiting List

The study found that Indonesia's long hajj waiting list stems not only from internal administrative factors but also from external global structures. First, the OIC quota formula of 1:1,000 has remained unchanged since 1987, creating a structural imbalance: countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia remain under-quota and unable to meet actual demand, smaller countries often have proportionally more quota than they need, and the backlog grows as demand outpaces quota expansion. Second, hajj capacity is inherently limited by *shar'ī* and geographical constraints: Arafah and Mina cannot be expanded beyond the boundaries set by Islamic law, and the standing (*wuqūf*) at Arafah requires physical presence on 9 Dhū al-Ḥijjah and cannot be substituted. Even if Saudi Arabia intended to increase quotas drastically, these limits would prevent capacity from being exceeded; they are not merely technical but *fiqh*-based, ensuring ritual validity, pilgrim safety (*ḥifẓ al-nafs*), and orderly rituals (*ḥifẓ al-dīn*). Third, hajj registrants in Indonesia grow by 10–14 percent annually, while quotas grow by only about 1 percent per year. Economic improvement, broader access to banking, and increased religious awareness drive this demand, and the mismatch between inflow (registrants) and outflow (quota) creates a structural backlog that persists despite administrative optimization.

Indonesia's Registration System from the Perspective of Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah

National registration practices contribute significantly to the prolonged waiting list. Key issues include:

1. *Uncontrolled year-round registration*: young registrants, including minors, register early to secure a quota, creating distortions and sidelining the urgent needs of elderly or obligated adults.
2. *The FCFS system*: it prioritizes administrative timing over *shar'ī* necessity, disregarding physical readiness, age, and urgency.
3. *Low initial deposits*: they encourage mass registration without a realistic intention to perform hajj soon, leading to idle quotas (a *ḥifẓ al-māl* concern).
4. *No assessment of istiṭā'ah at registration*: registration does not evaluate physical, financial, or spiritual readiness, allowing ineligible registrants to occupy slots.
5. *Regulatory gaps*: double registration, quota transfers, and manipulation create inequity contrary to the public interest (*mukhālafat al-maṣlaḥah*).

These practices affect all the *maqāṣid*: obligatory hajj is delayed for those already capable (*ḥifẓ al-dīn*); the elderly face higher health risks because of delayed departure (*ḥifẓ al-nafs*); uncertainty causes stress and anxiety (*ḥifẓ al-'aql*); funds remain tied up for decades (*ḥifẓ al-māl*); and children registered prematurely distort the fairness of the queue (*ḥifẓ al-nasl*).

Absence of a Shar'ī Priority Mechanism

Indonesia lacks a mechanism to prioritize those for whom hajj is an immediate individual obligation (*farḍ 'ayn*). As a result, elderly registrants may wait 30–40 years, so that their religious obligation is effectively blocked administratively, while young or unprepared registrants occupy slots despite lower urgency. Administrative priority thus overrides *shar'ī* necessity, contrary to the *maqāṣid* and to ethical allocation. In sum, the long waiting list results from external constraints (the OIC quota, the physical limits of Arafah and Mina, and rapid registrant growth) and internal flaws (the FCFS system, the lack of *shar'ī* prioritization, and administrative gaps). Reform is needed to align Indonesia's registration system with *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, ensuring fairness, timely fulfillment of obligations, safety, mental well-being, and efficient use of funds.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes, first, that Indonesia's hajj waiting list has both internal and external roots, but that its main source is not weak national governance but the global structure of hajj organization: the OIC quota formula of 1:1,000, which has not been updated since 1987 and leaves Indonesia permanently under-quota; the geographical and *shar'ī* limits of the *mashā'ir* (Arafah and Mina), which cannot be physically expanded; and a registrant growth rate that far exceeds quota growth.

Second, Indonesia's FCFS registration system is broadly consistent with the objectives of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, although important problems remain. The system is procedurally fair, and subsequent health checks ensure that only healthy registrants can settle the hajj fee and depart, regardless of age; younger registrants who remain healthy until their turn arrives meet the requirement of physical capability (*istiṭā'ah*), which ensures their safety (*ḥifẓ al-nafs*). On the other hand, *ḥifẓ al-nafs* is not fully ensured for elderly pilgrims, who face higher health risks; *ḥifẓ al-dīn* is affected because the obligation of hajj is delayed for decades, potentially beyond the individual's optimal physical condition; and *ḥifẓ al-māl* is affected because pilgrims' funds are tied up for 20–40 years. These problems represent room for sustainable improvement.

Third, Indonesia's hajj diplomacy has been effective in improving service quality, health care, and pilgrim protection, but it cannot change the *shar'ī*-geographical limits of Arafah and Mina, the global quota formula, or demographic changes in other countries.

On this basis, the study recommends, first, reforming the national registration system toward *maqāṣid*-based eligibility prioritization (*istiṭā'ah maqāṣidiyyah*) that focuses on the registrant's age rather than the date of registration, raising the minimum registration age, adopting adaptive queue schemes that consider health, age, the interval since a previous hajj, and urgency, potentially supported by machine learning and artificial intelligence, and educating pilgrims on *istiṭā'ah* and flexible *fiqh al-manāsik*. Second, diplomacy should be based on science and

research, targeting research collaboration on "vertical Mina" and "vertical Arafah," including their *shar'ī* validation by Saudi scholars, structured multi-wave departures, and advocacy for revising the OIC quota formula on the basis of need, demographics, and multi-variable fairness. Third, the governance of hajj funds, including the DAU and bridging loans, should be strengthened to ensure *ḥifẓ al-māl* through optimization, transparency, and enforcement against misuse. Further research is recommended on the mathematical modeling of the long-term backlog, the *fiqh* and technical feasibility of vertical Mina and Arafah, the redistribution of quotas between regions, and the simulation of *maqāṣid*- and *istiṭā'ah*-based registration and queue management policies.

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